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Here, at the shore of the Caribbean, the crab removes his eyes, casts them to the sea, and sings
for them to return.And they do.He watches as they—he—find home again, gliding through the
water, flying into the air, landing, balanced on their gangly stems.
Here the jaguar watches too—and demands to play, to be let in on the secret.The crab
hesitates and warns the jaguar that a large fish is swimming near, that he could eat the eyes and
they would be lost forever.Fearless, the cat the Venezuelans call el Tigre insists, and with a song,
the crab removes the jaguar’s eyes and casts them to the waves.Where they are eaten by the fish.
In blind rage the jaguar slashes out at the crab who crawls away in fear.Now the jaguar
collapses on the beach in spasms of whimpers and tears.In this way the buzzard comes upon him,
sees opportunity, and offers to help.“Find my eyes,” cries the jaguar, “and I will kill something
for you to eat.”
The buzzard stews up a hot paste of bark and grass and starchy roots, shapes it into two
balls, and shoves it into the jaguar’s empty sockets.In burning pain the great cat shrieks “I am on
fire, fool, and still I can’t see!”
“Open your eyes,” laughs the buzzard, and when he does the jaguar sees the world with
new eyes, flaming orange, that burn in the night.
And this is how the jaguar lost and found his eyes.
In Venezuela the city streets are filled with homeless dogs, perros vagabundos.I see them each
day from the car as I drive to the university, along the street as we walk to the grocery, from the
window and through the bars high up in the apartment where in the heat their bodies are distant,
shimmering, and waving in and out of focus as if, perhaps, illusions.
Weekdays, in mid-morning, a short-haired shepherd-mix plays in the dirt with workmen
two blocks south.They are building another apartment high-rise but they have yet to begin the
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foundation.The shepherd climbs little mountains of dirt—el rey de la montaña—and barks,
hoping someone will try to chase him off.From time to time the workers throw clumps of dry dirt
in graceful arcs across the lot where they explode like grenades into dust.The shepherd chases
each one, knowing there will be nothing left to fetch.He barks and rolls in the dirt, and at noon
they all have lunch.
Along the city streets I see the dogs traveling.They stay on the sidewalks, in general, and
cross at intersections.They trot with their heads tilted down, seldom looking around, giving the
impression that they are headed somewhere important, that they know precisely where they are
going and why.No mindless wandering; no stopping to beg.
I thought at first they were lost—a gringo assumption, I know now.They live in the city,
in neighborhoods, and are watched over by many people.In the United States, lost or stray, we
would catch them, kill them, secretly turn them into soap and chicken feed.Here they are part of
life, almost citizens.They remind me who I am, where I am, and keep moving on toward a goal
and destination of which they never speak.
I think of Emmanuel Levinas and Bobby, the stray dog who visited the philosopher in his
concentration camp.“The last Kantian in Nazi Germany,” Levinas called Bobby, because he
wagged his tail and reminded the prisoners who they were.It was something like “respect,”
writes Levinas.
I have no nightmare of suffering to compare, but I know the power of the stray dog.
And I know that dogs are not Kantians.
Even for Levinas, Bobby could not truly be a Kantian because he lacked “the brain
needed to universalize maxims and drives.”iIndeed, Levinas has nothing respectful to say about
animals in the short essay in which he recalls the few weeks during which Bobby affirmed the
humanity of the prisoners in Camp 1492.Bobby, we learn, has neither ethics nor logos.He is
animal and therefore subhuman.He is (truly) what the Nazis were trying to make (falsely) their
prisoners: “a gang of apes,” “no longer part of the world,” “chatterers of monkey talk”—
“signifiers without a signified.”iThese are parallels around which Levinas dances carefully: the
human and the animal, the Nazi and the prisoner, a meal of meat and the Holocaust.Heidegger—
as so often in these matters—is not careful, claiming, as he did in 1949, that the “motorized food
industry” was essentially the same as the gas chamber and concentration camp.iKnowing what
we know about Heidegger’s views on animal being, the comment is doubly dangerous.In Being
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and Time we learn that only Dasein can die—other living things merely perish.David Clark,
then, is right to worry that “Heidegger’s...assertion takes on utterly chilling consequences:
insofar as the Jews perish with and like the animals who die in meat-processing plants, that is as
essentially similar ‘fabrications’ of the military-industrial-agricultural complex, they cannot be
human...[and are thus slaughtered] with impunity.”iOne can read Heidegger as lowering the
horror of the Holocaust to the level of the carnivorous food industry, rather than raising the
tragedy of the carnivorous food industry to the level of that greatest tragedy, the Holocaust.The
lowering, no doubt, springs from evil intent.The raising is nobler, though perhaps
unutterable.Still, how much hierarchy!How great the need to order our sorrows!
At home, the “Puppies Behind Bars” program thrives.Inmates train seeing-eye guide
dogs, living with them in their cells.This is not the death camp of Levinas, though there is racism
at work throughout.But enough of the ranking of tragedy!Each day the men work with the dogs,
coming to know each other, coming to know what is expected.Hatred, say the program directors,
begins to melt away.The inmates become someone new.“Nobody needs to tell me I’m worth
something,” he says through bars and through tears.“This dog tells me that everyday.”i
Levinas does not speak of order.The first half of his essay concerns the problem of
animal rights—and here he is close to demanding vegetarianism; the second half is about
Bobby—and here he cannot bring himself to thank this animal Other.Yes, Bobby jumped up and
down and barked in delight when the prisoners returned in the evening, but Bobby didn’t mean
to.He didn’t mean it.Clark is right again: “What is ‘language’ if it is not the wagging of a tail,
and ‘ethics’ if it is not the ability to greet one another and to dwell together as others?”iBut for
Levinas, the barking was a signifier without a signified, not a choice, not a duty, but an
inevitable manifestation of his lowly being—a Cartesian Kantianism: input=see a man;
output=bark and jump.Should the stock market plunge and our fortune be lost, we will not think
to thank the servants for continuing to address us as “Madam” and “Sir.”It is what we are
regardless of our circumstances; they merely recognize it in a world gone mad.
When Ulysses returns and is recognized by his dog, the canine is, perhaps, “the last true
Greek in Ithica,”i but Bobby is no Kantian.Levinas’ reading of the bark turns us into
Kantians.With the bark, Bobby is thought to be playing a canine Kantian role.Instead of hearing
Bobby say “There is still love.I still love.And we are together,” Levinas hears the voice of an
inferior reminding him that whatever happens, the starry heavens will be above him, the moral
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law will be within him, and he is still an end in himself.It is good and needed news in a place of
despair, but it cannot be seen as a gift because nothing less was expected.
In the camp, remarks Levinas, “the French uniform still protected us from Hitlerian
violence.But the other men, called free,...stripped us of our human skin.”iOne wants to question
the philosopher on the importance of skin: human skin, a uniform, a coat of fur.Surely he sees
the absurdity, the categorial nominalism that creates the combatant, the civilian, the French from
the outer trappings of a covered body.One wants to place Bobby before Levinas and ask him to
acknowledge that furry canine skin as skin, entice him to question the bureaucratic separation of
species.But for Levinas there can be no face-to-face meeting, for Bobby has no face.i
It is via the face that one understands, for example, a dog.Yet the priority here is
not found in the animal, but in the human face.We understand the animal, the
face of an animal, in accordance with Dasein.The phenomenon of the face is not
in its purest form in the dog....I cannot say at what moment you have the right to
be called “face.”The human face is completely different and only afterwards do
we discover the face of an animal.I don’t know if a snake has a face.I can’t
answer that question....But there is something in our attraction to the animal....In
the dog, what we like is perhaps his child-like character....We do not want to
make an animal suffer needlessly and so on.But the prototype of this is human
ethics.Vegetarianism, for example, arises from the transference to animals of the
idea of suffering.The animal suffers.It is because we, as human, know what
suffering is that we can have this obligation.
Bobby cannot truly suffer; Bobby cannot truly have a face.Levinas has taken the Kantian
ethic and reformulated it in his own terms.As the measure of all things, Man has a duty to
himself only, but in as much as the animal is like him in some ways and he will become callous
toward humans should he mistreat animals, Man has a duty regarding the animal.iAnd so, too, do
we grant the animal some semblance of a face—distorted from its pure human form—and some
relief from suffering.The animal’s face is not his own—it is a reflection only.And the same holds
for animal suffering.i
What could Bobby be missing?Is his snout too pointy to constitute a face?Is his nose too
wet?Do his ears hang low; do they wobble to and fro?How can this not be a face?The truly
interesting debates begin with flies and octopi, with worms and jellyfish.Perhaps with crabs—
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those eyes!But a dog?The dog’s face is all there, all familiar, and with all the expressions of
sorrow, accusation, guilt, and joy that we have come to know—not out of a hollow transference
from us to them, but a bilateral pairing.iI know what expectation is partly because I looked into
my dog’s eyes when she would rush to the back door in preface to our going out to explore a
frozen stream, a newly tilled field, a distant corner of the woods where we found blackberries
that stained our lips, our skin.Did Levinas learn nothing of hope from Bobby?
Separated by hundreds of miles but tied together by the same war—the same evil
occupying a different homeland—Erazim Kohák’s father was a prisoner of the Gestapo in
Czechoslovakia for the first half of the 1940s.He lived his life on a wooden bench in a basement
of the Petschek Palace, sitting all day while waiting to be called for interrogation.The Nazi’s
imprisoned his body and further controlled his face, his gaze: he was to stare straight ahead,
glancing neither left nor right, his eyes fixed on the mass of the whitewashed wall before
him.Shackled in a demonic Platonic cave, Kohák had not even shadows on the bright surface to
keep him company.
How can one remain human?How can eyes return, thrown into a sea of white without
even the faces of fishes to look back?
And then one day a fly appeared, lit directly on the wall before the man’s gaze, and
proceeded to clean its wings with its hind legs.Not a simple spot of black on white, but a triumph
of life in an horizonless expanse of death, the fly returned Kohák’s eyes.Rejoicing, the man
could see and celebrate the detail others might miss: he could recognize and take a leg for a leg, a
face for a face, a gift for a gift.And for this soul who could see hope when it was offered, there
would be no later backpedaling, no philosophical tracts subtly ridiculing the wandering
animal.“It was a touch of life,” recalls his son, now a world famous environmental philosopher,
“...[and until] his death in 1996 my father never killed flies...[but] would catch them under a
glass and take them outside...with a word of thanks.I do it after him to this day.”i
Flies are on the wall all around me.Dogs wander in and out of my life.The animal’s body
is Here and There.The animal’s face is everywhere.
The cheetah tries to hide hers in a camouflage of spots.A butterfly tries to augment his
with predatory eyes stenciled to his wings.For the first few weeks of each season the rabbits are
fooled by the face of our inflatable owl in the vegetable garden (they soon catch on—the face is
dynamic and alive; it cannot be capture in plastic).To deny the animal face is to fear the demand
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it will make.Levinas admits that “the beginning of language is in the face...[that] in its silence, it
calls you.”iWhat need, then, is there for that verbal, human manifestation of logos?The animal’s
silent face is authority.And if Levinas is right, if this authority requests rather than insists, if “one
can do the opposite of what the face demands [because] the face is not a force,...[a]uthority is
often without force,”i then the face of the animal must be seen as especially demanding—
politically meek, historically ignored, as it is.
Levinas can offer no description of the face.When asked to define its necessary
characteristics—the needed bits and pieces—he rightly eludes a physical laundry-list and speaks
instead in ethical terms.The face is not a representation, not a thing which comes to hand; it is a
means to access: “it needs something.It is going to ask you for something.”iThis is what makes
our ethical relationships with animals incalculable: I do not know what request will be made.I
cannot capture it with rights or balanced utility summations, and therefore know what to do—
have completed my duty—up front.Being together means sharing a good and sharing a life, and I
cannot understand any of this without the transcendence of the face-to-face relationship.
Levinas has become a Kantian, but I know many dogs who are Levinasian.
Along the streets in Maracaibo I see the faces.I will only come to know a few—the city is
too large, too alienating.These are Bobby’s latino cousins, communitarians, wanderers.It is
important to remember: no one’s pet visited the camp.Bobby, too, was a perro vagabundo, and
in this way yet again different from Ulysses’ dog.Perhaps Bobby was like this short-haired
shepherd; perhaps they are both more like Ulysses than his dog.Here, an island of builders,
leveling mountains and making the Earth smoke.There, an island of prisoners, the presence of
evil, the chance for a hero to hint at hope before wandering on.

From the city to the jungle, to Arthur Conan Doyle’s Lost World somewhere in the heart of
Venezuela.i
For two days we made our way up a good-sized river, some hundreds of yards
broad, and dark in colour, but transparent, so that one could usually see the
bottom.The affluents of the Amazon are, half of them, of this nature, while the
other half are whitish and opaque....Twice we came across rapids, and in each
case made a portage of half a mile or so to avoid them....Of animal life there was
no movement amid the majestic vaulted aisles which stretched from us as we
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walked, but a constant movement far above our heads told of that multitudinous
world of snake and monkey, bird and sloth, which lived in the sunshine, and
looked down in wonder at our tiny, stumbling figures in the obscure depths
immeasurably below them.At dawn and at sunset the howler monkeys screamed
together and the parakeets broke into shrill chatter, but during the hot hours of
the day, only the full drone of insects like the beat of a distant surf, filled the ear,
while nothing moved amid the solemn vistas of stupendous trunks, fading away
into the darkness which held us in.
Preparing for a trip to Venezuela, one learns nothing from Conan Doyle.(I am reminded
of a German of my acquaintance who felt confident before his trip to Puerto Rico because he
could speak Latin.“Adverte dexter, sis!” he planned to tell the taxi drivers, offering directions
back to the hotel.)It is not just that there are no dinosaurs in Venezuela, but that there is life
everywhere—if one is not so quick to separate the human and animal worlds.
The lost world of Conan Doyle’s novel is lost, I take it, not in space but in time.It is true
that the Europeans “discover” the lost world (Professor Challenger, at one point, is called the
“Columbus of science”), but this is not the same as “recover.”The latter indicates that something
was lost and then found; the former gives no indication of prior knowledge of the thing’s
existence.
“Lost” is said in many ways.It is juxtaposed with both winning and finding.One can lose
something and one can be lost.
When we lose instead of win, there is a permanence to loss that appears to make it
different from losing, for example, the car keys.The keys, under the status lost, seem capable of
being found.But the permanent loss of, say, the World Series can never be undone.Still, it is not
the notion of competition—of winning versus losing—that is troubling here.It is this
permanence.For we can lose our virginity to a loved one, lose a loved one to death, or lose a
weekend to alcohol: all permanent losses with no mirror-possibilities of winning.The issue,
however, is still more complex.That which is lost can never truly be found.All loss is
permanent.The lost dog who makes his way home is found to be a new dog.Lost love is never
regained—even with the same person—but can only be replaced by another.Ulysses always
returns a new man.
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The search for what is lost, then, is always doomed.Yet we must search.The categories of
lost and found have a weird logic not unlike the giving and receiving of the gift.When the gift is
received it demands a new giving and thus is something other than a true gift.iSo, too, does
losing demand a search, although what we find is never what we lost; and thus, why look?
When something or someone is lost, we feel the loss as a present absence.How easy it
would be if “lost” meant “gone.”But the lost love is with us still, achingly, emptily intended.We
search her out the way the tongue probes the missing tooth; the pain of a lost parent is the pain of
the phantom limb, here and not-here.Being lost is a special form of absence.This is how the
jaguar lost and found his eyes—new eyes to see a new world.This is how fire remakes the old
into the new.This is why traveling eyes, swimming eyes, flying eyes, are disembodied but not
lost: the whole cat travels with his eyes through the sea; the return at the moment of the song is a
return but not a recovery.This is how the buzzard came to turn death into birth, the light of fire
into the light of a soul, loss into gain.
But when one is lost one’s self, the phenomenology is different.My Here becomes
nameless, anchored only to my bodily presence.The nexus of Theres that surround me become
unfamiliar, inhabited by unfamiliar Others.I do not lose my communitarian nature, but I feel I am
different, differently constituted by these Others and this place.To distant Others I may be
presenced as absent.To myself, I am present in the unknown.
Half a world away, ecologist Robert Michael Pyle, searching for Bigfoot, once got lost.In
retrospect, embarrassed, he looked back on his time and remarked:i
[n]o other animal has ever been lost.Disoriented, maybe.Temporarily confused
as to location.But unless tossed in a rat’s maze or transported far from home like
a bad bear, every creature knows exactly where it is at every waking
moment.Each “inferior” animal brain carries its own global positioning device
and Geographic Information System as standard operation equipment.Al least
this is what I believe about the essential nature of wild organisms: by definition
they are situated.Only people get lost.
I respect Dr. Pyle’s work—especially his excursions in search of our long lost hairy
siblings—but there is nothing right in this passage.Shall we work backwards?I fear his definition
of “person” is suspect.I want to hear more about “being situated” (I imagine he attributes it to
animals rather than humans because the modern, Liberal person is supposed to be rootless, ready
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to relocate when Bill Gates snaps his fingers, happy to abandon family and friends because, after
all, there is always e-mail to keep us together).I contest the notion that there are clearly wild as
opposed to domesticated organisms.I will fight to my last breath that any of us has an essential
nature in one of these categories.iI want to resist thinking—even metaphorically—that animals
are fleshy technology; it leads to Descartes’ robots, Malebranche’s brutality, and Kant.It leads to
no good.I ask us to think about the examples chosen as counter evidence.A rat lost in a scientist’s
maze?There is no home in a rat’s maze; how could the rat be lost?The maze, the laboratory, is
dystopia.The troublesome bear loses home not even because he displaces humans from theirs,
but because he threatens their vacation.Neither rat nor bear got There (instead of Here) on his
own; both were abducted, both were forced into the unknown.And this much, at least, is true: I
have known confused, disoriented, and lost animals.The labels are not synonymous.
What romanticism Pyle evokes!What a desire for mythical lost feral knowledge.The
guilty imperialist projects a purity onto the savage he seeks to enslave in a hidden hope that “we”
are truly different.
And yet the abandoned dog returns a hundred miles to his home through unknown
country; the hummingbird flies three days without stopping across the sea, unerringly returning
to her Venezuelan winter refuge.
What, then, does it mean to be situated?Must one have a home in order to become
lost?Can we understand “home” in a non-capitalist manner, free of mortgages and building
codes?Can we imagine it in a non-human manner—a way of belonging, a place to be without a
codified mailing address?Are the hummingbirds, like me, away from home when in South
America, yet fully appreciating their situation?
The belief that an animal cannot be lost is not the belief that an animal is situated, but that
an animal cannot be appropriately situated.Home, for us, has come to mean a fabrication, a
construct to shelter us from what we deem Other, the unknown, the natural world.But this nature
is where the animal lives, goes the thinking.How can she be away from home?One river is as
good as the next; any mountain will do.To say that the animal cannot be lost is to strip her of
home.
There is, as well, a residue of Levinas’ patronization in the claim—a sense in which the
animal is child-like, without a will or a direction.Max Scheler separates the human and the
animal this way:i
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The animal hears and sees—without knowing that it does so....For the animal
there are only those factors in the environment that are determined by attraction
and repulsion.The monkey who jumps hither and yonder lives, as it were, in
successive states of ecstasy....It does not have a “will” that outlasts the drives
and their changing states....An animal always arrives, as it were, elsewhere than
at the destination at which it originally aimed.
Unable to control its passions, Scheler’s animal cannot maintain the plan, cannot avoid the
temptation of straying off course.Each voyage would, in effect, be pointless.How can one be lost
if there is no place to be going?To say that the animal cannot be lost is to strip him of a will.
There are lost dogs.There are wandering dogs.And anyone who has seen both knows
there is a difference.The agony of the lost dog is the agony of the blind jaguar.The agony of the
lost dog is what drives him to search for a home a hundred miles away.Hearing only those stories
in which he succeeds, we imagine any animal capable of the feat.The majority, of course, leave
Penelope forever waiting.
Outside of Venezuela, across the water, home—it will be thought that I romanticize
homelessness.In America, wandering dogs struggle to survive.Most, though, maintain their body
weight; most are accepted (if only in the sense that other wandering animals are not accepted).iIf
they avoid traffic, the dog catcher, the soap maker, they can lead their lives; but it is hard.In
Venezuela they never receive handouts; they share in what is theirs.Each family offers a bit and
el perro vagabundo moves on.We think him homeless because he has no leash.His home is the
neighborhood.It is not to say that all dogs belong outside, then, but it is to recognize that a
neighborhood can be home, a place to belong.
These categories trouble us.Perhaps it is due, in part, to the fact that we have come to the
city rather than the jungle.In the city one needs a home, which is to say a rent payment, a
mortgage.I think of Harry Theodore in New York, a homeless man with eleven short hair
German pointers living with him under a cardboard roof on a cliff hanging above the railroad
tracks.With his social security check he feeds and provides shots for the dogs—$587 a month is
not enough to rent a human home in the city, but supplemented with turkey from the local deli it
is sufficient to feed a family of twelve; and even the local ASPCA must admit that the dogs are
well cared for.Still, they are considered strays: how can a homeless man provide a home for a
dog?(“He is a stray himself!” go the secret cries.“What sin he must have committed to have
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fallen so low!”)The ASPCAcannot help but find it troubling; the dogs should be spayed and
neutered.Eilene Leevy, running an animal rescue program on Long Island, finds it disgraceful.Of
the dogs, she says “they’re not living a good life.”iShe announces this with a look of sad
disapproval—of Theodore and his friends.She announces this standing in front of the rows of
cages at her shelter.And of course, she is, in part, right.Theodore and his dogs are not living the
American dream.And New York is in America, not Venezuela.The animals in Leevy’s cages—
will they have their sex organs mutilated?will they be murdered when no one claims them, no
one wants to provide them with more than a cardboard roof?will they live the good
life?Theodore is no romantic; life is hard, he laughs.When we define what a home means and
then deny it to some, we fail them.But we fail them twofold: in the defining and the denying.My
homeland has failed us all—human and animal alike.It has failed Theodore doubly.And if they
are netted and taken away, it will fail eleven short hair German pointers.
One cannot release dogs into the streets in the U.S. where a home has very nearly been
defined as the opposite of the street.It is not really the street itself that is problematic, but all of
the accompanying social goods that are denied when a home is not possessed, and all of the
social perceptions that go along with “home” and “homeless.”Homeless humans find the
circularity of it all nearly impossible.To get a home they need to pay for one with a job.To get a
job they need to list a home address.This is not just a political and economic problem; it is a
philosophically conceptual problem as well.Theodore needs to be allowed a shot at the good life,
an equal chance to realize his potential and achieve success.But can we not at the same time
question how we define “success,” question the very idea of the American dream
itself?Homeless dogs in the U.S. need care and the basic goods that come from having a home;
but can we not question how we define “care,” question the very idea of home itself?
There is nothing wrong with a dog in the family, a dog with an address.But it requires a
moral vigilance not to become a master to a pet, not to see every animal as a stray until it is
under our control—physically (in a house, in a cage) and conceptually (as a house pet, as a
stray).There is nothing to be said in general.As is always the case, the challenge is specific to the
place, the time, and the type of creatures—human and otherwise—trying to make a friendship
work.
Their bodies overlapped nearly to the point of becoming one.A green head appeared from the
middle of the jumble, a dry green mouth slowly opening, carefully closing—like a vision from
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my childhood, women from my great-grandmother’s nursing home kissing excess lipstick onto a
sandwiched Kleenex on a Saturday night.The water was two centimeters deep, just enough so
that if the three sea turtles were separated, they could stay submerged or stretch their necks
above the waterline to breathe and dry their heads.But the only escape from the water
completely, from the plastic bottom against which their tiny nails scraped, was to pile Yertle-like
one on top of the other.Their stacking skills, still, were not so well developed, and often the
attempt left only a jumbled mess of turtles.
In Maracaibo I came to care for my niece’s sea turtles, buying a large blue tub to replace
the small, clear box; filling it with stones—purchased stones—to form islands; changing their
water; feeding them—like a zoo-keeper—with compassion.It was a job of tending and
protection.How could I have been more than a good steward?How could I approach them in any
way other than their superior?What could I be to the three other than a caretaker?
And then one night while doing dishes in the back washroom a black lizard the size of
my thumb crawled in through the barred window above the sink and sat on the wet cement near
the faucet.He moved impossibly fast; his toes were spread impossibly wide in a graceful fan at
the end of each foot; he stuck impossibly to the dripping wall of the sink, cranked one eye in my
direction and turned to face me.Self-conscious, I froze.The moment was pregnant with
possibility.
The turtles, too, looked at me all day long.I think they came to know me.Eventually they
didn’t swim away when I approached as they did with others.I didn’t know if they smelled me or
heard my voice each time, reassuring them as I drew near.I am just a philosopher.I didn’t study
them, and I didn’t know them long.But I imagine that they learned my face.My clothes changed
each day; what other visual sign could there have been?So we looked at each other and came to
develop the best relationship we could.With the noblest intentions I could aspire only to be the
keeper of their plastic home.But the lizard....His motions, his thoughts were unscripted.The
relationship was open on both ends.We could become anything together.
I wanted to please the turtles so that they would be as comfortable as possible and
perhaps not hate me.I wanted to please the lizard so he would stay and perhaps let me get to
know him.The difference is not just that the latter was free to leave, though this did create
possibilities for us that were not there with the turtles.It is not a Libertarian’s freedom that I wish
to celebrate; a freedom to pick up and leave and not be bothered by others.It is that I, too, was
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able to become something new, something unknown, something better.I am not sure if this is
ever possible with pet sea turtles.It is probably possible with a dog.I work to make it possible
with life around me.How easily each relationship could degenerate without the constant care that
love and friendship require.How easy it is to slip into a pre-ordained role of dominance in this
fallen world.Remember, warns Levinas, before paradise was lost, Adam was a vegetarian.
The Pemón Indians of Southeastern Venezuela say that when you are asleep your soul wanders
and can get lost in an animal.i
A man sees his brother sleeping on the floor of the rainforest.A lizard crawls
under the belly of the sleeping man, squeezing between flesh and soil.It emerges
and runs a few feet away into the half-buried skull of a long-dead cow.It twists
and turns, trapped and disoriented, moving from chamber to chamber—paths,
cavities, and compartments that have formed from the deteriorating bone—until
it finds its way out and disappears into the jungle.The sleeping man awakens and
says “Brother, I dreamt that I was lost in a large house, going from room to
room, panicked, until I finally found my way out, my escape.”And the brother
understood, because he knew that the lizard had carried the soul of his sibling
while he slept.
From the belly is born new life.If becomes the thought of a cow; it explores death, the
holes with which death leaves us, the presence of the absence of bodies, our interchangeable
bodies.
We know now that the Pemón get lost.Home is not a house.Paradise will not be a sub-let
in the Amazon.“In my father’s mansion there are many rooms,” is a threat, not a promise of
reward.
I wonder: Who visited me while I washed dishes?
Does the lizard not have a soul of its own?Yes, but a human soul can visit, invited, piggy
backed.What then is the lizard?An honored courier?A glorified beast of burden?A friend.This is
not Scheler’s animal on the rainforest floor, on the wet cement.He is willful.This is not Conan
Doyle’s jungle.The lizard is so much like us—no! we are so much like the lizard—that this union
is blessed, this body is an appropriate gift, a temporary home for a wandering human.The giving
flesh does not reject the respectful xenotransplant.And the panic, too, is shared: we do not want
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to be lost to death; the brother and the lizard do not want to make a home of death.Animals do
not merely perish.It is something the two E(I)mmanuels could never understand.
Yet this is the cost of all odysseys—the jaguar feeds death to purchase new eyes, new
life, a new way of being.Eyes swimming through the water, eyes darting home through the air
are still mine, but when I am eaten by the Other—as I am bound to be, my eyes, my flesh, my
bones licked clean—I will no longer be me.Should I return in the muscle of a fish, in the blood
of a buzzard, in the toes of a lizard, you may not recognize me.The lost dog who makes his way
home is always found to be a new dog.And still, we cast our eyes to the sea.
i
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